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ARGUMENT 
I. THE STATE URGES THIS COURT TO CONSIDER POSSIBILITIES 
RATHER THAN THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL 
Instead of focusing on the evidence presented at trial, the State urges this court to 
consider possibilities if inferences are drawn. The State speculates that because 
Stringham had alcohol in his system he could not have started the car if an interlock 
device was installed. This speculation assumes that he did not consume the alcohol after 
the car was started or have one of the other occupants of the car start the vehicle. The 
State also speculates that because Stringham did not testify concerning an interlock that it 
necessarily must follow that interlock device was not installed. This speculation ignores 
the fact that Stringham was never asked if an interlock device was installed. Furthermore, 
this line of speculation assumes that Stringham would want to acknowledged that the 
interlock device was installed. However, this reasoning is likewise shortsighted because 
such an acknowledgment would likely subject Stringham to more criminal liability if it 
was shown that he removed the device to thwart an investigation. 
The bigger issue is it that the foregoing speculation contradicts the only direct 
evidence presented at trial. Specifically, the only direct evidence was from the 
investigating officer whose testimony concerning the interlock device was that "when I 
first approached I did notice one, and then after I found this information, and later during 
the impound of the vehicle, there was no interlock in the vehicle." (R.268). Stringham 
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respectfully submits that his conviction was based on speculation and his counsel's failure 
to provide any real legal assistance on the interlock violation. 
II. STRINGHAM HAS MET HIS BURDEN OF ESTABLISHING 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
The State's argument when viewed in its totality is that Stringham cannot meet 
either Strickland element because he did not tell the officer or the trial court that he had 
an interlock device in the car. Appellee's Brief at 9. Stringham was never specifically 
asked in either situation whether he had an interlock device in the car. (R. 190-205). As is 
addressed supra, there are many reasons why Stringham would not desire to disclose such 
information. Nevertheless, if Stringham is guilty of all offenses which he did not take the 
initiative to deny then he is indeed guilty of an interlock violation. This approach would 
clearly be a perversion of the State's burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
A. Mr. Humiston's performance fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness. 
Stringham does not lightly submit a claim that Mr. Humiston's performance was 
ineffective. However, it is difficult to assert any fact from the record which demonstrates 
that Stringham received any assistance of counsel on the charge of an interlock violation. 
The State does not marshal any facts which tend to show that Mr. Humiston's 
performance was effective. Stringhami was convicted of Operating a Vehicle without an 
Interlock System in violation of U.C.A. §4 l-6a-518.2(3). This statute states, "An 
interlock restricted driver that operated or is in actual physical control of a vehicle in this 
-2-
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state without an ignition interlock system is guilty of a class B misdemeanor." Thus, the 
crime has three simple elements-that a 1) restricted driver 2) operates or is in actual 
physical control of a vehicle 3) without an ignition interlock system. 
To meet this burden the only evidence presented by the State concerning whether 
Stringham was operating a vehicle without an ignition interlock system was Officer 
Gledhill's testimony that "when I first approached I did notice one, and then after I found 
this information, and later during the impound of the vehicle, there was no interlock in the 
vehicle." (R. 268). Mr. Humiston did not address Officer Gledhill's testimony on cross 
examination, did not move to dismiss for lack of evidence when the State rested, did not 
move for directed verdict and failed to ever even mention the exculpatory evidence to the 
jury. Stringham's counsel never even asserted that the evidence on the ignition interlock 
was ambiguous. 
Stringham submits that a finding that Mr. Humiston's representation met an 
objective standard of reasonableness would be bad public policy and perhaps a violation 
of his right to competent counsel. Counsel has little to no obligation at trial if the 
representation at issue is not deemed insufficient, especially when considering the basic 
nature of the charge and the simplicity of the testimony. Stringham also respectfully 
asserts that any decision on representation should be judged by the basic notion that 
defendants have a right to effective assistance of counsel. See generally, Menzies v. 
Galetka, 2006 UT 81, 150 P.3d 480 (Utah, 2006). 
-3-
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B. But for counsel's deficient performance there is a reasonable 
probability that the outcome of trial would have been different. 
The State's argument is essentially that because Stringham did not tell the officer 
or the trial court that he had an interlock device in the car the lack of evidence constitutes 
circumstantial evidence. Appellee's Brief at 9-10. The State then goes on to argue that 
this circumstantial evidence shows that regardless of counsel's performance the outcome 
of trial would have been the same. Id. Stringham does not submit that verdicts cannot 
properly be reached by exclusively considering circumstantial evidence. Indeed, the Utah 
Supreme Court noted that "it has long been established" that the elements needed to make 
out a cause of action "may be proven by direct and by circumstantial evidence." State v. 
Romero, 554 P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 1976) (citing State v. Richards, 29 Utah 310, 81 P. 142 
(1905)). . * "fi" ' ' ' ' *• "* *' • • 
However, lack of evidence is not the same thing as evidence of absence. Here, 
because the Stringham didn't volunteer information that an interlock was installed the 
State asserts that his failure to do so acts as circumstantial evidence that no such device 
was installed. Appellee's Brief at 9. When considering the absence of evidence as 
circumstantial evidence of absence the State asserts that "the evidence was clearly 
sufficient to support a finding that he had no interlock device installed in his car." Id. 
Stringham however respectfully assents that forgoing argument by the State does nothing 
to show the second Strickland element cannot be met. 
-4-
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To prevail in a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel "the defendant must 
show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Utah courts have restated the requirement as a required 
showing that "but for counsel's deficient performance there is a reasonable probability 
that the outcome of the trial would have been different." Wickham v. Galetka, 2002 UT 
72,\19,61R3d978. 
Stringham asserts that simply bringing the officer's testimony to the jury's 
attention would have created a reasonable probability of a different outcome at the trial. 
In reading the closing arguments in their entirety, the jury is clearly led to believe that all 
the evidence is uncontroverted. (R.305-314). That portrayal would have been soundly 
rebutted by simply restating Officer Gledhill's testimony that "when I first approached I 
did notice one" (R. 268;. A reasonable recitation of the evidence is thai when Officer 
Gledhill first approached Stringham's vehicle he viewed an interlock device installed, but 
later during an inventory of the vehicle the interlock was missing. The evidence also 
showed that Stringham had been drinking, was a restricted driver and was in control of 
the vehicle. Nevertheless, the evidence shows that an interlock device was installed when 
he was driving and later removed. This should have been presented to the court and the 
jury and the record shows that it was not. Stringham therefore respectfully asserts that the 
Strickland elements have been met. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Stringham's class B misdemeanor conviction for 
violation of U.C.A. §41-6a-518.2(3), Operating a Vehicle without an Ignition Interlock 
System, should be reversed. 
Dated this QO day of December, 2012. 
William L. Reynolas 
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